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Did Board Conﬁguration Matter? The Case of
US Subprime Lenders
Maureen I. Muller-Kahle* and Krista B. Lewellyn
ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: The origins of the global ﬁnancial crisis have been attributed to the combination of a housing
price bubble and innovative ﬁnancial instruments, as well as the lack of restraint by corporate executives and boards to
engage in excessive risk-taking. The rise in subprime lending between 1997 and 2005 played a crucial role in inﬂating the
housing price bubble. We take a unique dataset of US ﬁnancial institutions heavily engaged in subprime lending and ask the
following research question: Did board conﬁguration play a role in determining whether a ﬁnancial institution specialized
in subprime lending?
Research Findings/Insights: We use a matched-pair sample of ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial industry from 1997–2005 with half of
the sample specializing in subprime lending and conduct panel data logistic regression analysis. We ﬁnd that the board
conﬁgurations of those ﬁnancial institutions that engaged in subprime lending were signiﬁcantly different from those that
did not. Speciﬁcally, subprime lenders had boards that were busier, had less tenure, and were less diverse with respect to
gender.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study uses the group decision making perspective in the context of subprime
lending to examine board of director conﬁguration and its inﬂuence on decision making processes around the issue of risky
subprime lending. Findings show that how boards were conﬁgured did inﬂuence the decision to specialize in subprime
lending. We ﬁnd robust support for predictions based on the group decision making perspective.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The deterioration of mortgage lending requirements that gave rise to the defaults of so
many subprime loans, in retrospect, appears to be something that should have been entirely preventable. By demonstrating
that subprime specialists had signiﬁcant differences in board conﬁguration that impacted group decision making, this study
offers guidance to policymakers considering additional regulation and for corporate ofﬁcers examining corporate governance issues.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Subprime Lending, Group Decision Making, Board of Directors, Board Busyness,
Board Gender Diversity, Board Tenure

“W

e almost invariably spent more time living with the
consequences of our decisions than we do in
making them” (Pfeffer, 1972:19). Group decision making has
been studied in the context of both top management teams
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) and the board of directors
(Amason, 1996; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Scholars have
examined decision speed (Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge & Miller,
1991), decision quality (Amason, 1996; Atkinson & Atkinson,
2006; Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Schweiger, Sandberg, &
Ragan, 1986; Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003), decision accuracy
(Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major, & Philips, 1995),
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and decision processes (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, &
Schulz-Hardt, 2007) in the context of top management teams
and boards of directors.
Others have studied the dynamics of group decision
making within the board of directors and identiﬁed several
challenges confronting boards as they strive to be involved
in the strategic decision making process. Bainbridge (2002)
suggests that social loaﬁng, where some members choose
not to actively participate in board decision making, and
herd-type behavior where a decision maker “imitates the
actions of others while ignoring his/[her] own information
and judgment with regard to the merits of the underlying
decision” can both be problematic issues that arise as boards
seek to be involved in strategic decision making (Bainbridge,
2002:28). Groupthink has also been cited as a problem where

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

406

too much group cohesiveness can lead to diminished critical
thinking (Janis, 1983). More recently, Westphal and Bednar
(2005) ﬁnd that pluralistic ignorance can occur in boards,
meaning board members fail to express concerns about corporate strategy based on others not expressing concern.
With the possibility of these numerous issues that can
arise in group decision making, are there ways to structure
the board of directors to increase the likelihood of effective
group decision making? We suggest the recent context of the
subprime mortgage industry provides a unique research
setting to study board of director conﬁguration and its
impact on board decision making. Many argue for the need
to move away from studies of board demography or board
characteristics to a more holistic approach (Johnson, Daily, &
Ellstrand, 1996; Kim, Burns, & Prescott, 2009; Pettigrew,
1992. Ingley and van der Walt (2003) use the term board
conﬁguration when examining how board structure can
improve decision making effectiveness.
Many point to subprime mortgage defaults in the United
States as being the key trigger to the global ﬁnancial crisis
that began in 2007 (Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010).
Subprime loans are deﬁned as “loans granted to borrowers
with low credit ratings” (Piskorski, Seru, & Vig, 2010:370).
Recent reports estimate that 3.6 million homeowners in the
US will have to foreclose on their homes because they are
unable to meet their loan obligations (Simon, 2010). As of
2008, US ﬁnancial institutions are facing estimated losses of
up to $300 billion as a result of their subprime lending
(Sherman & Tana, 2008). The collapse of the subprime
market and the subsequent ﬁnancial shock that rippled
across global markets can be attributed to a combination of
factors, but has its roots in risky US mortgage lending practices (Wolf, 2010). Clearly, if the global ﬁnancial crisis can be
compared to an earthquake, subprime lending is at the
epicenter.
In this paper, we examine the impact of the board of
director conﬁguration on the decision making abilities of the
board of directors in the context of the US subprime industry
by asking the following research question: Did board of
director conﬁguration limit the decision making abilities of
ﬁnancial institutions and lead certain ﬁrms to heavy involvement in subprime lending? Using the group decision
making perspective to guide our analysis, we argue that
some ﬁrms had board conﬁgurations which led to inferior
group decision making processes leading ﬁrms to specialize
in risky subprime lending, which not only adversely
impacted ﬁrm performance, but, on a mass scale, contributed to the global ﬁnancial crisis. We use a unique dataset of
ﬁrms identiﬁed by the US Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) as specializing in subprime lending and compare
their corporate governance mechanisms to a matched pair
sample of non-subprime specialist ﬁrms to test a theoretical
framework underpinned by group decision making theory.
In doing so, we seek to contribute to corporate governance
literature and, in particular, add to the knowledge about the
strategic decision making role of boards.
This paper adds to the corporate governance literature by
considering how certain attributes of boards impact their
effectiveness in ﬁrm decision making. In addition, it furthers
understanding of antecedents leading to the global ﬁnancial
crisis. The assumption that a ﬁrm’s board of directors con-
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stitutes a group responsible for monitoring ﬁrm level strategic decisions (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) guides our
examination of how board conﬁguration impacted the decision to specialize in subprime lending. In the next section,
we develop the theoretical framework underpinning our
study, including a discussion of the rationale for using the
subprime lending context and the group decision making
perspective. Following the development of testable hypotheses, we discuss the methodology employed, and the results
from our analysis. We conclude with a discussion of the
ﬁndings including theoretical and managerial implications.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Subprime Lending Context
Kranacher (2008) provides an excellent summary of the
subprime mortgage loan process. First, individuals were
able to acquire loans with poor credit and little to no income
veriﬁcation. Second, mortgage lenders used introductory
“teaser” rates to qualify borrowers. Third, loans were then
re-packaged and sold into collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) and sold to other investors. Investors were unable to
gauge the riskiness of these loans. Fourth, CDOs were then
packaged into loan groupings on the basis of risk level,
labeled by credit rating agencies as AAA to A for the best
group, BBB to B for the middle group, and the riskiest were
not rated or covered by bond insurance. Fifth, many of these
CDOs were transferred to off-balance sheet special purpose
vehicles and held by banks. When homeowners with poor
credit and increasing payments began to foreclose, the riskiest CDOs were not insured and the remaining CDOs were
inadequately covered by underfunded bond insurance
which in turn led to huge losses and dramatic failures of
many ﬁnancial institutions and a worldwide global ﬁnancial
crisis.
Given the colossal failures of ﬁrms such as Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco in the early 2000s and now, with the global
ﬁnancial crisis, the topic of corporate governance continues
to garner much attention. Solomon (2007:14) deﬁnes corporate governance as “the system of checks and balances, both
internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their shareholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their
business activity.” Firms are governed by both internal and
external governance mechanisms (Denis & McConnell,
2003). Internal governance mechanisms include such things
as the board of directors and the ownership structure of the
ﬁrm, while external governance mechanisms include the
market for corporate control and the pertinent legal system.
Agency theory has been the dominant theoretical perspective used in research on boards (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, &
Dalton, 2007; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). The central
tenet of agency theory is an overarching concern about the
divergence of interests between principals and agents (Berle
& Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Berle and Means
(1932) trace the growth of the American corporation from a
single proprietorship to a public corporation and suggest
that this new structure was likely to give rise to problems of
ownership and control. As a result, there is the fear that
managers may be acting in their own self-interest instead of
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the interests of the corporation. In other words, opportunistic managerial decision-making could adversely impact
company performance. This gave rise to agency theory that
was further enhanced by the work of Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) who posit that managers
may misuse corporate assets for their own personal beneﬁt
and at the expense of shareholders. Thus, agency costs can
diminish corporate performance.
A core agency theory premise is that boards are conﬁgured to monitor company executives and protect shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Monitoring activities
include hiring and ﬁring top managers (Johnson et al., 1996),
assessing and rewarding top management performance,
ratifying managerial decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1997), and overseeing strategic initiatives
(Rindova, 1999). However, many studies including recent
meta-analyses show equivocal results when examining relationships between ﬁrm performance and agency variables
such as board independence, CEO duality, and board size
(Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Researchers are
beginning to explore drivers and implications of board
behavioral dynamics (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Payne,
Benson, & Finegold, 2009; Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 2006)
speciﬁcally from a group dynamics perspective. This study
aims to contribute to this research.

Group Decision Making Perspective
The study of group decision making has its roots in the ﬁeld
of psychology via cognitive theories, but has been also
studied by management researchers. Cutting and Kouzmin
(2002:28) deﬁne a decision as a “judgement, assessment, or
cognitive commitment to a particular knowing.” Blinder and
Morgan (2005) ﬁnd that groups make better decisions than
individuals. Boards are not only decision-making groups
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999) but are also the “apex of the ﬁrm’s
decision control system” (Fama & Jensen, 1983:311). Boards
are unique work groups who meet on average only seven
times per year (Monks & Minow, 1995).
We build on Forbes and Milliken (1999) who identify three
key components of board effectiveness: the presence and
usage of knowledge and skills, effort, and cognitive conﬂict.
We posit that these components are linked to how long
directors have served on the board, how overcommitted they
are to other entities, and whether the board has gender
diversity and in turn how these board conﬁgurations impact
board decision making effectiveness.
Usage of Knowledge and Skills and Board Tenure.
Forbes and Milliken (1999:495) deﬁne use of knowledge and
skills as “the board’s ability to tap the knowledge and skills
available to it and then apply them to its task.” We argue that
boards with low tenure lack internal knowledge of ﬁrm and
industry speciﬁc issues and thus, are not as effective in
decision making as boards with greater tenure. Boards with
directors that have less tenure have also been deemed ineffective, as a result of their inability to effectively challenge
management (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Three studies examining the relationship between board tenure and ﬁnancial
fraud found that boards with low tenure were more likely to
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engage in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting (Beasley, 1996;
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Dunn, 2004). These studies
suggest that at low levels of tenure, boards are more likely to
acquiesce to management, putting a hold on expressing
opinions and questioning management until they are more
familiar with company and its operations. In the context of
the current study, at low levels of tenure, boards may be less
likely to questions management’s decision to specialize in
subprime lending. Deﬁned as “the fruits of an organization’s experience” (Rothwell & Poduch, 2004:406), institutional memory is important as it leads to higher quality
output (Bainbridge, 2002). When boards have low tenure,
they may lack necessary skills and knowledge due to low
levels of institutional memory. Thus, we predict a negative
relationship between board of director tenure and subprime
lending, leading to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1. Board of director tenure will be negatively associated with
subprime lending.
Effort and Board Busyness. Forbes and Milliken (1999)
argue that effort level is another important determinant of
effective group decision making. Effort is deﬁned as the
level of energy a member devotes to a task (Wageman, 1995).
Effort levels can be inﬂuenced by group norms (Feldman,
1984; Steiner, 1972). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that
decision quality can suffer due to the lack of time directors
have to devote to board duties. Others argue that many
directors do not put signiﬁcant effort into their board duties
and are not fully engaged with their board duties (Herman,
1981; Mace, 1986).
Thus, we posit that effort levels by board members are
diminished when directors serve on multiple boards. Multiple board appointments can adversely affect a board’s
decision-making effectiveness as directors are overcommitted and inattentive. Furthermore, two groups, the National
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) and the Council
of Institutional Investors (CII), have recommended placing
limits on the number of board appointments an individual
should accept. NACD suggests that individuals holding
senior corporate executive positions should accept no more
than three board appointments, while the CII recommends
that individuals holding full-time jobs be limited to no more
than two board appointments.
There is empirical evidence to suggest that busy boards
have an adverse impact on ﬁrms. Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker (1999) ﬁnd a positive relationship between director
busyness and excessive CEO compensation. Others ﬁnd a
negative relationship between number of outside board
seats and ﬁrm performance. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a majority of outside directors holding more board seats have a 4.2 per cent lower book
to market ratio, lower operating ROA, lower asset turnover
ratios, and lower operating return on sales. They also point
out methodological problems of noisy data that does not
distinguish between inside and outside director busyness in
the Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) study which
ﬁnds a positive relationship between busy boards and ﬁrm
performance. Jackling and Johl (2009) also ﬁnd a negative
relationship between multiple directorships and ﬁrm performance in a sample of Indian ﬁrms. Finally, Jiraporn, Singh,
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and Lee (2009) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with multiple directorships
tend to be more diversiﬁed and are more likely to suffer
from diversiﬁcation discounting (Denis, Denis, & Yost,
2002).
We posit that a ﬁrm’s decision to heavily engage in
subprime lending may have arisen from the board being busy
with the affairs of other entities, thus lacking time and motivation to put in the effort required to provide meaningful and
adequate strategic guidance. Thus, ﬁrms with busy boards
are more likely to suffer from ineffective group decision
making that could lead to ﬁnancial ﬁrms choosing to take part
in subprime lending. Thus, the next hypothesis is offered.
H2. The level of outside director busyness is positively associated with subprime lending.
Cognitive Conﬂict and Gender Diversity. The third
component of Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) model is the
need for cognitive conﬂict in group decision making. Cognitive conﬂict is deﬁned as “task-oriented differences in
judgment among group members” (Forbes & Milliken,
1999:494). Cognitive conﬂict can be beneﬁcial to boards for
several reasons. First, when there is lack of cognitive conﬂict,
groupthink can occur (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998) and decision quality suffers. Second, when board members disagree
on an issue, additional discussion about an issue is required
and the CEO is forced to allocate additional time and effort
to alleviate concerns and possibly introduce new strategic
options (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Third, others ﬁnd that
diversity within the decision making group can improve
decision making quality due to group members having different educational, functional and industry backgrounds
(Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). Ancona and Caldwell (1992)
ﬁnd that diverse groups have higher levels of cognitive conﬂict because group members bring many different types of
information into group discussions.
We examine cognitive conﬂict with respect to gender
diversity for several reasons. First, reports suggest that only
15 per cent of Fortune 500 boards have a woman on the board
(Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008). Miller and del
Carmen Triana (2009) note that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 mandated increased independence of boards opening
up many new opportunities for women to join boards. With
more women climbing the corporate ladder, it is important
to address the issue of board gender diversity. Indeed, others
have called for increases in research on the impact of board
gender diversity (Bilimoria & Wheeler, 2000; Burke, 2000).
Diversity “relates to board composition and the varied
combination of attributes, characteristics, and expertise contributed by individual board members in relation to board
process and decision-making” (Van der Walt & Ingley,
2003:219). Prior conceptual and empirical research suggests
that board of director diversity is beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm. First,
board diversity is thought to increase legitimacy among
stakeholders (Ray, 2005) and lead to better stakeholder relationships (Tyson, 2003). Second, diverse boards show the
beneﬁts of cognitive conﬂict as they foster more effective
strategic decision making (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988;
Schweiger et al., 1986) and increase the likelihood of needed
strategic change (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Goodstein,
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994).
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Other ways gender diversity on the board can potentially
improve corporate governance are by providing a larger
assortment of perspectives for assessing managerial decisions and actions as well as providing increased levels of
information search (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007).
Several studies report that boards containing women are
more civilized and sensitive (Bilimoria, 2000). Research also
suggests that women are more collaborative (Konrad,
Kramer, & Erkut, 2008).
Increased diversity of skills, experiences, and backgrounds are more likely to raise questions that add to, rather
than simply echo, the voice of management” (Selby,
2000:239). Women are not part of the “old boys’ network”
and thus, can be considered to be more independent than
male board members (Brennan & McCafferty, 1997).
Increased independence translates into increased heterogeneity of ideas leading to higher quality decisions (Amason,
1996). Many studies have found a positive impact of board
gender diversity on ﬁrm performance (Bernardi, Bean, and
Weippert, 2002; Burke, 2000; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson,
2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). Recently, Nielsen
and Huse (2010) found that boards with gender diversity led
to increased board strategic control.
Using the group decision making perspective, we argue
that board gender diversity encourages cognitive conﬂict
which leads to more effective decision making within the
ﬁrm and, thus, ﬁrms with gender diversity will be less likely
to engage in subprime lending. More formally stated:
H3. Gender diversity of the board of directors is negatively
associated with subprime lending.

METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data
The sample used in this study consists of 74 US based publicly traded ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial industry in 13 SIC codes
ranging from 6,021 to 6,798 over the period from 1997–2005.
The data is sourced from US Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), Thomson One Financial, and
DEF14A Proxy statements ﬁled with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Thirty-seven of the 74 ﬁrms are designated as subprime
specialists by HUD, which created and maintained a database of ﬁnancial institutions that were heavily engaged in
subprime lending from 1993–2005. The database contained
485 publicly and privately held companies that were
heavily involved in subprime lending any time from 1993–
2005. HUD ceased updating their database after 2005.
Subprime lenders were identiﬁed by HUD using a twostep process. First, HUD used three indicators to narrow
the list of lenders who specialized in subprime – origination rates, resale of portfolios, and rate spreads. From
there, these lenders were either called or their web pages
were visited by HUD staff to verify their subprime status.
A lender was identiﬁed by HUD as being a subprime specialist if over 50 per cent of their lending portfolio consisted of subprime loans (HUD, 2010).
As subprime lending was so limited in the early years, we
chose to look at data from 1997 to 2005. Chomsisengphet and
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Pennington-Cross (2006) report that subprime lending grew
from a $65 billion business in 1995 to a $332 billion business
in 2003. As our research objective was to study the subprime
industry as a catalyst of the global ﬁnancial crisis, we felt it
prudent to start our sampling in 1997.
Of the 485 companies in the HUD database, 438 were
privately held leaving 47 publicly held ﬁrms. Next, we utilized Thomson One Financial to acquire ﬁnancial data. Governance data was then hand collected from SEC DEF 14A
proxy statements. There were no proxy statements for 10 of
the ﬁrms, leaving a ﬁnal sample of 37 ﬁrms specializing in
subprime lending over 1997–2005. The mean number of
years that the ﬁrms in the sample appeared on the HUD
subprime list is 4.4, with a range from one to nine years.
From inspection of the data, there was no incidence of a ﬁrm
appearing and reappearing on the subprime specialist list.
In summary, the total ﬁrm years for the subprime specialist
ﬁrms are 172.
We then obtained a matched pair of companies that did
not specialize in subprime lending. We matched ﬁrm size
(via total assets) and industry (to a four digit SIC) for the
ﬁrst year that the ﬁrm appeared in the study. For example,
if the ﬁrst year of the sample ﬁrm was 1997, then we found
a corresponding ﬁrm in the same four-digit SIC that was
within 10 per cent of total assets in 1997 and never subsequently on the subprime specialist list. If the ﬁrm had data
for the full nine years of the sample, we used the same
control ﬁrm throughout the time frame. If the ﬁrst year
that ﬁrm appeared on the subprime list was 2003, we then
found a control ﬁrm that matched asset size and SIC in
2003. Thus, our ﬁnal sample consists of 74 ﬁrms and 344
ﬁrm years. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the full sample
by year.
All ﬁnancial data was sourced from Thomson One Financial. Governance and ownership data was hand collected
from proxy statements (Schedule DEF14A reports) ﬁled
with the SEC. Compact Disclosure was also used to source
of some of the ownership data that was missing in the
Schedule DEF14A. Due to missing observations on some
variables, the ﬁnal sample consists of 275 observations over
1997–2005.

TABLE 1
Full Sample Total Sample Break-Down by Year
Year

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

38
44
48
46
42
34
34
28
30

11.05
12.79
13.95
13.37
12.21
9.88
9.88
8.14
8.72

11.05
23.84
37.79
51.16
63.37
73.26
83.14
91.28
100.00

Total

344

100.00

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Measures
Dependent Variable. For this study, we utilize one
dependent variable, Subprime. Subprime is a dichotomous
variable which takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is on the HUD
Subprime Specialist List and 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables. Endogeneity, or reverse causality is less plausible, given our research design. In our empirical tests, all of our independent variables are collected in the
year preceding the ﬁrm identiﬁed on the subprime list. Thus,
measures for our explanatory in the earlier period could not
have resulted from identiﬁed as a subprime specialist in the
subsequent period.
Our key explanatory variables are board of director tenure,
outside director busyness, and board gender diversity. We follow
Dunn (2004) and measure board of director tenure as the total
number of years served on the board by each director
divided by the total number of directors. Data on board of
director tenure was sourced from ﬁrm proxy statements.
Outside director busyness refers to the number of outside
board seats each outside director holds divided by the
number of outside directors. Board of director busyness has
been measured several different ways. Jiraporn et al. (2009)
measure the total number of outside directorships held by
both inside and outside directors. Ferris et al. (2003) used
four different measures for board busyness: (1) average
number of director positions held by all the directors; (2) the
maximum number of director positions held; (3) the percentage of directors that held three or more outside director
positions; and (4) the average number of outside director
positions held by outside board members. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) criticize the operationalization of the Ferris et
al. (2003) study suggesting that their measures are noisy,
suggesting that the data does not distinguish between inside
and outside director busyness. Instead, they deﬁne a board
as busy if a majority of the outside directors have three or
more board positions.
Finally, Jackling and Johl (2009) use two measures of board
busyness. The ﬁrst measure of board busyness is the average
number of directorships held by both inside and outside
directors of a ﬁrm. The second measure is the average
number of director positions held by outside directors of the
ﬁrm. As this study is indirectly examining the monitoring
capabilities of outside board members, the second Jackling
and Johl (2009) measure is used. Thus, outside director busyness is measured as the average number of director positions
held by outside directors of the ﬁrm and was sourced from
proxy statements.
We follow Miller and del Carmen Triana (2009) and
measure board gender diversity as the proportion of women to
total directors and the data was also sourced from proxy
statements.
Control Variables. Our model includes three types of
control variables to capture the impact of variables that may
inﬂuence group decision making dynamics: board, CEO,
and ﬁrm related characteristics. As with the independent
variables, all control variables are lagged one year. First, we
control for other governance variables such as board size,
board independence, and staggered board. Board size is
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included as a control variable as it has been shown to have
some impact on group decision making. Some suggest that
large boards can bring additional perspective to discussions;
however, large boards can also contribute to social loaﬁng
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Additionally, Judge and Zeithaml
(1992) found that the board size is negatively related to strategic decision making. Board size is deﬁned as the total
number of members that are on the board of directors
(Judge, Gaur, & Muller-Kahle, 2010). Data on board size is
sourced from proxy statements. We also examine the impact
of board independence on the decision to engage in
subprime lending. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) argue
that board members differ in their access to information
which could have an impact decision making. They argue
that inside board members have greater access to information that outside board members who are not as knowledgeable about the day to day affairs of the company and must
rely on the information presented by the CEO. Thus, we
include board independence as a control variable. We measured board independence as the ratio of independent directors to total directors. Next, we control for staggered boards
as this could have some impact on board decision making.
Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with staggered boards are less likely to accept a hostile offer
bid even though it could be to detriment of the shareholders.
We follow Pathan (2009) and create a dummy variable for
staggered board which takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s entire
board is not up for re-election at the same time and 0 if it is
a unitary board with all members standing for election each
year.
Second, we control for CEO characteristics by controlling
for CEO duality, CEO tenure, and CEO ownership. Cutting
and Kouzmin (2002) argue that when the CEO performs
the dual role of chairperson on the board, the concentration
of power can cause dialogue and discussion to diminish
and potentially impact board decision making. Furthermore, Westphal and Zajac (1995) suggest that a CEO who
is also the chairperson of the board may be more likely to
select board members who will not challenge him/her.
Following Boyd (1995), a dummy variable for CEO duality
is created by coding 0 for separated CEO and chair roles,
and 1 for a combined CEO/chair role. CEO duality data is
also sourced from proxy statements. As CEOs gain tenure,
they are more likely to establish bonds with the board of
directors, become more entrenched, and receive less scrutiny (O’Sullivan, 1999). Miller (1991) shows that long
tenured CEOs avoid making strategic changes. Similarly,
top management team research shows that top management teams are less likely to make large strategic changes
as their tenure increases (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990;
Grimm & Smith, 1991; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992); thus,
CEO tenure may impact board of director making. We
deﬁne CEO tenure as the total number of years that person
has been in the CEO role.
As CEO ownership increases, scholars have found that
CEO have their personal wealth at stake and are more likely
to utilize the board in an advisory capacity (Beatty & Zajac,
1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995). Following Zhou (2001), we
deﬁne CEO ownership as the total number of shares held by
the CEO divided by the ﬁrm’s total number of outstanding
shares.
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The last three control variables are used to control for ﬁrm
related effects–ﬁrm age, ﬁrm size, and debt to equity. The age of
the ﬁrm could have some impact on group decision making
within boards as younger ﬁrms may be under greater pressure to involve boards in key decisions (Judge & Zeithaml,
1992). Furthermore, Mishra, Randøy, and Jenssen (2001)
determined that ﬁrm age is an important determinant for
business characteristics and company goals. Firm age is calculated by the total number of years since incorporation and
is calculated by the difference between the subprime year
and the ﬁrm’s year of incorporation lagged one year. Firm
age data is sourced from Thomson One. We include ﬁrm size
as a control variable as it has been shown to have some
impact on group decision making in boards. Finkelstein and
Hambrick (1996) ﬁnd that boards in smaller ﬁrms have more
input in decision making. Firm size is measured by the book
value of total assets (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that ﬁrm managers may prefer to use
debt ﬁnancing instead of equity as a strategy to avoid scrutiny by shareholders, lessen the monitoring by the board,
which could impact board decision making. Thus, we use a
control variable, debt-to-equity, which is deﬁned as total debt
divided by total assets.

Methods
Since our dependent variable, subprime specialist, is dichotomous in nature, we utilize a binary logistic regression
model. Moreover, as our sample is longitudinal, we use a
panel logistic regression to test our hypotheses as this
method enables us to account for within ﬁrm correlation in
the error terms. We use a random effects model for several
reasons. First, our sample is made up of an unbalanced panel
as not every ﬁrm appears for the full nine years of the
sample. Second, we used random effects estimation, since
ﬁxed-effects estimation requires signiﬁcant within panel
(ﬁnancial ﬁrm) variation of the variables to produce efﬁcient
estimates (Zhou, 2001). Many of the independent variables,
such as board independence and ownership structure are
stable over time, within ﬁrm variation for these variables is
minimal. Also, since ﬁrms were only listed as a subprime
specialist if they were on the HUD list there are many years
where a ﬁrm is not listed at all, and with a ﬁxed effects
model, these ﬁrms would be dropped, making the applicability of this procedure inappropriate for the analysis.

RESULTS
Correlations
All variables were tested for normality using the STATA 10.0
Skewness-Kurtosis test (sktest) and all variables are found to
be normally distributed. Next, correlations and descriptive
statistics for all the variables included in the study are presented in Table 2. There seems to be no major problems with
multi-collinearity as all correlations are under .58. To be
sure, all independent variables were checked for multicollinearity via analysis of variance inﬂation factors (VIF)
and results also reported in Table 2. All independent and
control variables have variance inﬂation factors (VIF) well
under the suggested value of 10 with the mean VIF of 1.55
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TABLE 2
T-tests Comparing Means of Key Variables
Non-subprime
specialist

Subprime
specialist

Mean

Mean

T-Stat

8.67
0.80

5.78
1.15

5.63***
-3.33***

0.10

0.08

1.82†

0.72

0.70

0.74

9.51
.61
.74
12.61
9.05
52.99
7.77
.03

9.83
.65
.73
13.94
7.79
34.84
7.56
.03

Variable
BOD tenure
Outside Director
Busyness
Board Gender
Diversity
Board
Independence
Board Size
Staggered Board
CEO Duality
CEO Ownership
CEO Tenure
Firm Age
Firm Size
Debt to Equity

-.65
-.86
.22
-.58
1.37
3.33***
.67
.78

†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Subprime is a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 if the
ﬁrm is on the HUD Subprime Specialist List and 0 otherwise. Board
independence is the ratio of independent directors to total directors.
CEO duality is a dummy variable is created by coding 0 for separated CEO and Chair roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chair role.
We deﬁne CEO ownership as the total number of shares held by the
CEO divided by the ﬁrm’s total number of outstanding shares.
Board of director tenure as the total number of years served on the
board by each director divided by the total number of directors.
Outside director busyness is measured as the average number of
director positions held by outside directors of the ﬁrm. Board gender
diversity is the proportion of women to total directors. Board size is
deﬁned as the total number of members that are on the board of
directors. Staggered board is a dummy variable which takes the value
of 1 if the ﬁrm’s entire board is not up for re-election at the same
time and 0 if it is a unitary board with all members standing for
election each year. CEO tenure is the total number of years that
person has been in the CEO role. Firm age is calculated by the total
number of years since incorporation and is calculated by the difference between the subprime year and the ﬁrm’s year of incorporation lagged one year. Firm size is measured by the book value of
total assets. Debt-to-equity is deﬁned as total debt divided by total
assets.

differences in means for the key variables in the study. First,
it is important to note that there is no statistical difference in
ﬁrm size as measured by total assets. As the matched pairs
were selected on total assets, there should be no difference in
ﬁrm size between the two samples. Signiﬁcant differences
were found in the following variables – board tenure, outside
director busyness, board gender diversity, and ﬁrm age.
Subprime ﬁrms had boards of directors with signiﬁcantly
less tenure than the control ﬁrms (t = 5.63, p < .001).
Subprime ﬁrms also had signiﬁcantly busier boards
(t = -3.33, p < .001) and less board gender diversity (t = 1.82,
p < .10). Last, subprime ﬁrms were much younger than the
control ﬁrms (t = 3.33, p < .001).

Logistic Regression
The results of the panel data logistic regression with
subprime as the dependent variable can be found in Table 4.
Two models are built and tested in a hierarchical manner. In
Model 1, only control variables are used. In Model 2, the
three main effect variables are added; thus, comparing
Model 1 and Model 2, it can be demonstrated that the model
becomes robust. Furthermore, there are signiﬁcant improvements between Models 1 and 2 as indicated by changes in
the Chi-Square values and using a Chi-Square test of model
ﬁt. In addition, likelihood ratio tests indicate a signiﬁcant
improvement in model ﬁt between Models 1 and 2.
H1 suggested that there would be a negative relationship
between board of director tenure and subprime lending. In
Model 2, the coefﬁcient for board of director tenure is negative and signiﬁcant, thus providing strong support for H1
(Model 2: b = -1.25, p < .000). Therefore, H1 is supported. H2
posited a positive relationship between outside director busyness and subprime lending. The coefﬁcient in Model 2 is positive and signiﬁcant (Model 2: b = 1.65, p < .01). Thus, the
data supports H2. H3 stated that there would be a negative
relationship between board gender diversity and subprime
lending. Again, the coefﬁcient for board gender diversity in
Model 2 is negative and signiﬁcant (Model 2: b = -12.94,
p < .05). Therefore, H3 is supported. In summary, three
hypotheses that examined the inﬂuence of attributes connected to group decision making processes of the board of
directors on subprime lending were introduced and empirically tested. Empirical support was found for all hypotheses.
In the next section, we will discuss the ﬁndings in greater
detail.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
and the highest value equal to 2.11; thus, we do not have any
problems with multi-collinearity.
There is a strong negative correlation between board of
director tenure and subprime specialist as well as board gender
diversity and subprime specialist. In addition, we ﬁnd a strong
positive correlation between outside director busyness and
subprime specialist.

Univariate Analysis
In Table 3, the sample was divided into subprime and prime
ﬁrms and t-tests were run to provide a univariate analysis of
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Given that subprime lending in the US played a signiﬁcant
role in the global ﬁnancial crisis, this study makes a contribution by examining the role of corporate governance
among ﬁrms that specialized in subprime lending between
1997 and 2005. In retrospect, we now know that the decision
to be involved in subprime lending brought huge levels of
risk to ﬁrms. Using a unique dataset provided by HUD, we
created a matched pair sample of ﬁnancial ﬁrms that specialized in subprime lending and those who did not and examined the differences in board conﬁguration. We found that
board tenure and board gender diversity were negatively
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Subprime
BOD tenure
Outside Director Busyness
Board Gender Diversity
Board Independence
Board Size
Staggered Board
CEO Duality
CEO Ownership
CEO Tenure
Firm Age
Firm Size
Debt/Equity

.50
7.38
.96
.09
.71
9.66
.63
.74
13.24
8.46
44.91
61,268
.03

.50
4.64
.93
.13
.18
4.38
.48
.44
19.99
8.06
51.36
191,371
.05

Std. Dev.

1.99
1.34
1.44
1.63
1.74
1.28
1.23
1.43
2.11
1.50
1.74
1.11

VIF
1.00
-.31
.19
-.14
-.04
.04
.05
-.01
.03
-.08
-.18
.07
-.04

1

1.00
-.14
.36
.13
.12
.10
.14
-.06
.58
.24
.17
-.13

2

1.00
.07
.06
.28
-.13
-.19
.01
-.20
.20
.41
.02

3

1.00
.12
.19
.10
.01
-.07
.38
.13
.17
.11

4

1.00
.41
.26
.12
-.46
.03
.22
.25
.10

5

1.00
.07
.03
-.26
-.14
.43
.42
.01

6

1.00
.14
-.20
.02
-.09
-.27
.00

7

1.00
.14
.24
-.01
-.17
-.10

8

1.00
.00
-.02
-.15
-.16

9

1.00
.01
-.09
-.12

10

1.00
.41
.03

11

1.00
.04

12

All correlations in bold are signiﬁcant at p < .05. Subprime is a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is on the HUD Subprime Specialist List and 0
otherwise. Board independence is the ratio of independent directors to total directors. CEO duality is a dummy variable is created by coding 0 for separated CEO and Chair
roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chair role. We deﬁne CEO ownership as the total number of shares held by the CEO divided by the ﬁrm’s total number of outstanding
shares. Board of director tenure as the total number of years served on the board by each director divided by the total number of directors. Outside director busyness is
measured as the average number of director positions held by outside directors of the ﬁrm. Board gender diversity is the proportion of women to total directors. Board size
is deﬁned as the total number of members that are on the board of directors. Staggered board is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s entire board is not
up for re-election at the same time and 0 if it is a unitary board with all members standing for election each year. CEO tenure is the total number of years that person has
been in the CEO role. Firm age is calculated by the total number of years since incorporation and is calculated by the difference between the subprime year and the ﬁrm’s
year of incorporation lagged one year. Firm size is measured by the book value of total assets. Debt-to-equity is deﬁned as total debt divided by total assets.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Mean

TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
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TABLE 4
Panel Binary Logistic Regression (Dependent Variable: Subprime Lending)
Variable

Constant
Controls
Board Independence
Board Size
Staggered Board
CEO Duality
CEO Ownership
Firm Age
Firm Size
Debt to Equity
Direct Effects
BOD tenure
Outside Director
Busyness
Board Gender Diversity
Model c2
D c2
Sample size
Log likelihood

Model 1

Model 2

Beta

Std. Err.

Beta

-3.96

8.84

-1.1

4.21
.24
-2.56
-1.98
.03
.01
.00
.00

11.72
.49
3.75
4.54
.07
.04
.00
.00

Std. Err.
3.56

1.25
.33
1.44
.15
.06
-.02
.11
.00

4.86
.21
1.70
1.86
.05
.01
.11
.00

-1.35
1.65

.25***
.69**

-12.94
5.44 (8 df)

7.42*
74.48 (11 df)
69.04***
N = 275
-37.47

N = 277
-27.79

†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Subprime is a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is on the HUD Subprime Specialist List and 0 otherwise. Board size
is deﬁned as the total number of members that are on the board of directors. Board independence is the ratio of independent directors to
total directors. Staggered board is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s entire board is not up for re-election at the same
time and 0 if it is a unitary board with all members standing for election each year. CEO duality is a dummy variable is created by coding
0 for separated CEO and Chair roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chair role. We deﬁne CEO ownership as the total number of shares held
by the CEO divided by the ﬁrm’s total number of outstanding shares. CEO tenure is the total number of years that person has been in the
CEO role. Firm age is calculated by the total number of years since incorporation and is calculated by the difference between the subprime
year and the ﬁrm’s year of incorporation and lagged one year. Firm size is measured by the book value of total assets. Debt-to-equity is
deﬁned as total debt divided by total assets. Board of director tenure as the total number of years served on the board by each director
divided by the total number of directors. Outside director busyness is measured as the average number of director positions held by outside
directors of the ﬁrm. Board gender diversity is the proportion of women to total directors.

related to the decision to specialize in subprime lending
while outside director board busyness was positively related
to the decision. These results support our group decision
making perspective predictions.
The results of our study add to the body of literature
suggesting that characteristics of board members are important. Our ﬁnding that board tenure is negatively related to
subprime lending adds support to research that has found
younger boards may be too inexperienced to be effective
(Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Dunn, 2004). We discovered a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between board
busyness and subprime lending which adds to work done in
this area, by supporting the notion that busy boards may not
be the most effective boards when it comes to overseeing
risky strategic initiatives (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Jackling
& Johl, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2009). Our evidence that board
gender diversity negatively impacts the decision to specialize in subprime lending not only contributes to governance
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research but makes a contribution to the diversity research
stream. The greater the percentage of women on the board,
the less likely a ﬁrm was to specialize in subprime lending.
Our ﬁndings suggest that board gender diversity can have
differential and positive impacts on ﬁrm operations, possibly by providing ﬁrm decision-makers with a wider range of
view-points and alternative modes of decision-making, particularly when risky strategic decisions are being evaluated.
Despite the signiﬁcant ﬁndings, there are some limitations
to this study. First, while we relied on a unique dataset from
HUD of ﬁrms specializing in subprime lending, we had
difﬁculty ﬁnding ﬁnancial data for a number of the listed
ﬁrms. A large portion of the ﬁrms in the HUD dataset were
privately owned. Furthermore, it would have been better to
have more exact information about the level of subprime
lending as a proportion of their overall business. Further
studies may be able to utilize a dataset with more extensive
data on the level of subprime lending. In addition, some of
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our control ﬁrms may have been involved in subprime
lending, but to a lesser extent than the 50 per cent cut-off set
by HUD.
Our second limitation is our reliance on archival data. The
study of corporate governance is in desperate need of additional studies that provide insight on the “black box” of
board decision making. Further studies may be able to
uncover richer insights on how boards interact with top
management to monitor and provide strategic insight in the
context of strategic decision making.
Finally, our study was US-centric because the subprime
banking crisis originated there. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
and Aguilera and Jackson (2003) suggest that governance
environments differ between countries. It would be interesting to examine the role of the board of directors in subprime
lending across different governance environments as there
has been sparse research comparing the subprime lending
intensity across different governance environments.

Theoretical, Managerial and Policy Implications
There are theoretical, managerial, and policy implications of
this research. This study makes a contribution to the literature as the group decision making perspective was successful in predicting whether a ﬁrm engaged in risky subprime
lending. It also suggests that the board of director conﬁguration can inﬂuence board decision making in the ﬁrm.
For managers and shareholders, this study ﬁnds that
board conﬁguration is an important determinant of good
decision making. Firms need to be aware of the extra challenges that boards face as a group that only meets sporadically (Monks & Minow, 1995). Thus, group decision making
problems such as herding, group think, and pluralistic ignorance can easily be exacerbated. Firms need to pay closer
attention to board tenure and make sure that the board
remains balanced with respect to board experience with the
focal ﬁrm. Special attention may be needed for younger
board members to encourage them to speak out and actively
engage in strategic decisions. Creating a climate where cognitive conﬂict or the asking of tough but productive questions should be encouraged. Furthermore, the ﬁndings
suggest that busy boards can be problematic. While busy
boards can provide extensive external networks for companies, board members may be too consumed with matters
related to multiple ﬁrms to have the time and energy to
provide the type of effort needed to add value at the focal
ﬁrm. Board nominating committees should carefully balance
experience with how over-committed a director may
become, when selecting potential board members. Finally,
we clearly demonstrate that board gender diversity adds
value to a board. For enhanced decision making processes,
ﬁrms would be advised to continue to strive to add diversity
to board rooms. Finally, consistent with our ﬁndings, Atkinson and Atkinson (2006) offer three recommendations to
improve board decision making. First, they suggest that
“chairs could attempt to engender both task and relation
oriented atmospheres in the boardroom” (Atkinson & Atkinson, 2006:26) so that key decisions are more thoroughly discussed. Second, they recommend speaking rituals whereby
all members are routinely asked for input on decisions.
Third, board members are encouraged to be recognized for
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their efforts. Implementation of these suggested activities
may mitigate some of the negative inﬂuences and enhance
the positive ones we found in our study.
For policymakers, the study provides evidence about the
important role of corporate governance and possible directions for future regulation (Kranacher, 2008). Pattanaik
(2009:21) argues that increased regulation is necessary as
“free market forces had created a monster out of the underlying sub-prime loans through ﬁnancial innovations, whose
potential for a global systemic meltdown was largely
ignored because of the growing perception among policymakers that free markets and globalization together had
succeeded in delivering a prolonged period of high growth
and low inﬂation for the world economy’ ” however, regulation is not a simple task. John Carver), a noted governance
expert, states that, “governance theory will not be a ‘one size
ﬁts all’ prescription as to structure and composition, but a
coherent framework of fundamental, global principles
upon which each board’s individual practices can be left to
vary in recognition of contextual and cultural particulars
(2010:150).”
To conclude, this study makes a signiﬁcant contribution to
the literature and practice with regards to corporate governance and the global ﬁnancial crisis. We are optimistic our
ﬁndings will generate additional research on these important issues.
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